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This interview was occasioned by two events. The first was the publication 
of Infinitely Demanding, Simon Critchley’s new book that concisely 
formulates the views that he developed over the last decade on the 
relation between politics and ethics. The second was his visit to the 
University of Amsterdam in June 2008, at which time he agreed to do this 
interview. 
Simon Critchley (1960) has established a long track record in both 
publications and institutional affiliations. In the early nineties he 
published an edited volume on Levinas (together with Robert Bernasconi) 
and a monograph on the ethics of deconstruction in Levinas and Derrida, 
a revised version of the Ph.D. thesis he defended at the University of Essex. 
By now, he has authored more than a dozen books, among which the 
well-known Very little ….almost nothing (1997) and On Humour (2002 – 
available in Dutch, together with the translation of Continental 
Philosophy. A Very Short Introduction [2001]) to the more recent Things 
Merely Are (2005), The Book of Dead Philosophers (2008, available in 
Dutch in 2009) and On Heidegger’s Being and Time, together with Reiner 
Schürmann. Critchley holds teaching posts on both sides of the Atlantic: 
he has been a professor of philosophy at the University of Essex since 1989, 
as well as at the New School for Social Research in New York since 2004. 
He also was a programme director at the Collège Internationale de 
Philosophie in Paris, from 1998-2004. In between, he held visiting profes-
sorships at Notre Dame, the Cardozo School of Law, Los Angeles, Sydney, 
Oslo, and Nijmegen. As from January 2009 he will be professor of 
philosophy at the University of Tilburg in the Netherlands, visiting a 
couple of times a year for intensive seminars. 
The main problem that you address in your book is a so-called 
‘motivational deficit in liberal-democracy’. We have two questions with 
regard to your analysis of the motivational deficit. First, to what extent is 
there such a motivational deficit? You emphasize all sorts of informal 
local activities. Does this not suggest that there is a lot of motivation, 
interest and willingness to engage in political action? Is the problem of 
motivation then not a purely philosophical, Kantian problem that has 
disappeared on the local level of secular liberal democracies at least? 
Secondly, you conceptualize the motivational deficit in distinctly ethical 
terms. Yet your main target is political: you criticize a particular 
conception of political life or political conviction, namely, the Bush admi-
nistration. To what extent is your ethical interpretation of the motiva-
tional deficit adequate to address the political problems you identify? Put 
otherwise: how should we see the relation between the motivational 
deficit and the war on terror? 
SC: The main claim I make is that there is a motivational deficit in secular 
liberal democracy, in its institutions, its habits. This is the problem or crisis 
in normal politics: a demotivation in multi-party politics and parliamen-
tary politics. On the other hand, there is a remotivation at the level of 
non-governmental or non-parliamentary politics. New forms of politics 
have emerged - forms that I call ‘neo-anarchist’ - and that are successfully 
mobilizing political anger that no longer resonates with classical forms of 
politics. 
The motivational deficit in liberal-democracy in relation to the Bush 
regime is complicated. There is not a necessary link between the two but 
we should note that the Bush regime has a lot of motivational power. It is 
a theological project: even though it makes noises of the secular type, say 
on human rights, it is doing politics through right-wing evangelism. That 
is one way of doing politics. I don’t think that it is the best way of doing it; 
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it is the response on the left that interests me. The Bush regime 
understands the nature of politics or how popular fronts can be formed. 
They are good students of Carl Schmitt and even Gramsci: they 
understand how coalitions are built. With the Bush regime you know 
what you get, a clear Straussian agenda. There is an intellectual dignity to 
the project whatever you think of it. Left liberals in the US on the other 
hand have been clueless for thirty years. The opposition on the left is 
either sentimental or constitutional. Look at where all the American 
Habermassians have ended up: all they think of is law, legal issues, 
constitutional niceties. To that extent I am much more critical of the 
democratic party and the left liberals then I am of the Bush regime. 
But has liberal democracy not been successful up to a certain degree? Of 
course, not everyone is included, but there has been a practical learning 
process in liberal-democratic states.  
SC: One possibility is to stay in the framework of liberal-democracy and 
try to defend it against conservative undermining, and improve it. That is 
a good Habermassian response. I don’t believe in it for a moment. I don’t 
think there was an “Enlightenment project”, as Habermas put it. In fact, I 
think that this is a weird version of history. It made sense as a response to 
the disaster of national-socialism, the need to engage in a Normalisierung 
of German philosophy and German politics. To that extent it has been 
successful. But elsewhere? Motivations are so much more complicated 
than Enlightenment norms, think of the strength of national, religious 
and ethnic affiliations… 
But once you reject that liberal-democracy has been successful or has a 
potential for improvement, do you not end up with the old-fashioned 
idea of politics as directed against the state? Is real politics non-
govermental, anti-institutional or anti-state politics? Should we forget 
about the state and institutions? Or is the problem or challenge rather 
that of linking institutional and legal politics with new forms of politics?  
SC: The last option. But I begin with the ontological premise that the state 
is a limitation on human existence. I am against the state, law, bureau-
cracy and capital. I see anarchism as the only desirable way of organizing 
politically. I have always been very suspicious of authoritarian forms of 
Marxism and crypto-authoritarian forms of Marxism in different guises. 
Anarchism for me is a practice of popular self-determination and its 
political form is federalist. I can imagine a series of moves that could be 
made to establish a radically federalist form of politics in for example 
Western Europe. You just decide to abolish all the nationalist state 
structures and have the EU or some loose framework in which there is 
local autonomy on the level of towns or regions. It would be like Gandhi’s 
vision of India as consisting of a 100,000 self-governing villages. There is 
just not a will to do it, certainly not in established politics, because 
politicians would vote themselves out of existence. In my view, anarchism 
is not that unrealistic: it is a way of describing how people actually orga-
nize practically, doing things in localities all over the place. Its power is on 
the practical level, its weakness is theoretical. Anarchists are good at 
practice but not in theory, that is why the universities are full of Marxists. 
Marxism works perfectly in the university machine. But if you push 
anarchists theoretically, it is often not very interesting. ‘Too much apple 
pie’, as I put it in my book Infinitely Demanding. 
Can we give you a Gramscian counter-example? Gramsci talked to 
laborers in factories trying to get them organized in an anarchist way, but 
he was resented by both laborers and the labor unions for thus disrupting 
and undermining the fragile bonds of labor solidarity that had been 
precariously established.. More generally, it is very unattractive to get or-
ganized in something like a Räterepublik, because it is unclear what it has 
to offer, and tends to be very unstable. 
SC: The problem is that people have been ideologically cultivated to 
identify with the nation-state and its institutions. It is seemingly terrifying 
to think of an alternative to the nation-state. And although I have worked 
as a union activist, unions are not always the best allies: as we can see in 
the history of unions in the US, union activities can be very reactionary 
and conservative.  
Now, to go back to the question of the state: I don’t think a society 
without the state is the only desirable outcome in politics. As Schmitt 
said, there are two traditions in political thought: authoritarian and 
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anarchist. They both derive from conceptions of human nature. If you 
think human beings are wicked, you turn to an authoritarian conception 
of politics, the Hobbesian-Macchiavellian-Straussian line. That will always 
be more attractive to intellectuals because they think of themselves as 
having deeper insight into human nature and it corresponds to the 
wickedness we intellectuals tend to see all over the place. You then end 
up with a leftist Schmittianism, such as defended by Chantal Mouffe, who 
presents a Freudian anthropology that focuses on the wickedness of 
human beings. That is a convenient and easy position to defend, because 
you will never be contradicted by events. Anarchism, in contrast, is based 
upon a certain innocence and optimism about human nature, or better, 
about human capacities. In that sense I am an utopian and an optimist 
about what human beings are capable of and I look for that evidence or 
examples as to how human beings will freely and mutually cooperate 
outside the activities of the state. 
Now, the question of linking new forms of politics and institutions has 
indeed become crucial. The sequence of politics from, say, 1999 to the 
anti-war demonstrations and the rest, is in many ways encountering the 
limits of the politics of protest. In the final chapter of Infinitely 
Demanding, I defend politics as the creation of ‘interstitial distance’ within 
the state. 
What I am interested in is how new forms of political subjectivity are 
formed and created, how new spaces are opened, just like the politics of 
sexuality in the past couple of generations. This does not proceed at a 
distance of state but tries to force a space within the state. I have just spent 
ten days at home in England. Very depressing. The state saturates all areas 
of social life through surveillance to a degree that would have been 
unimaginable twenty years ago. It shocked me. If you cross London, you 
are photographed thirty times. There is thus no space in the state and 
politics consists in the creation of such a space around a demand and then 
articulating it in relation to the state. In the book I illustrate this with the 
indigenous rights movement in Mexico from the 1980s to the present. The 
classical category of resistance in Mexican politics, the peasant, had ceased 
to be effective. But there was the possibility of the creation of a new 
political subject, the indigenous, at a distance of the state. This happened 
by using the lever of the right to create that distance. Rights are levers of 
political articulation. 
My concept of politics thus differs from a theorist like Rancière, who is 
after a more ethics-free conception of politics. Rancière’s concept of 
politics is descriptively powerful of certain situations, such as the protests 
against the French in Algeria, which for him is a paradigmatic case. But 
politics for him is a spontaneous emergence of ‘la politique’, there is no 
normative framework or notion of ethical subjectivity around which you 
can build such a notion of politics. For him that would be just another 
symptom of nihilism. Mouffe wants a Schmittianism without Catholicism 
which is completely implausible, because Catholicism is what is doing the 
motivational work for Schmitt. 
You strongly emphasize that new forms of political subjectivity need to be 
theorized in an ethical vocabulary rather than purely political terms. With 
regard to the linkage between ontology and politics you take a radically 
different stance. For instance, you reject a conceptualization of an 
ontology of the social in favor of purely political terms. Is that not a 
dangerous strategy given the current political predicament? Both indi-
vidualist right-based conceptions of state-centered liberalism as well as 
strong conceptions of community as defended by, say, the teleological 
civilizationists and neo-Schmittians, lay a claim on social life. Resistance 
against these hegemonic projects, as Gramsci suggested, proceeds through 
coalitions that need some sort of practice-based action such as habits and 
rituals. Do philosophers not have a role in cultivating some ontological 
premises that bring into light a conception of social practice that is neither 
individualist nor communitarian? Is an ontology-free conception of 
politics not overly vulnerable?  
SC: Yes, such a conception is vulnerable. There is no ontology that can be 
appealed to as a basis for organizing political life, whether that is Negri’s 
idea of the multitude or Habermas’s idea of communicative rationality. I 
reject the search for guarantees or deeper structures that underlie politi-
cal activities. This is why I am interested in a philosopher like Badiou: he 
makes the ontological question as uninteresting as possible. The onto-
logical questions are just explained by set theory because for him that is 
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the best language we have to express being qua being. Regardless of 
whether that is true or not, the consequence of that is a radical deflation 
of the ontological question. For Badiou, the philosophical question is not 
about producing events but about describing the conditions under which 
events have happened or might happen. I find that much more appealing: 
There is no transitivity between ontology and politics.  
I am arguing against strong ontological readings of Marx that are based on 
his idea of species-being (Gattungswesen) but particularly against Hardt 
and Negri. For a Spinozist like Negri there is one substance: nature or the 
multitude. The present condition is under the reign of empire but it will 
shift to multitude. There is of course a change of the modality of the 
substance, but the ontology is doing the work. I am as suspicious of that as 
I am of the ontologization of politics in Heidegger. Heidegger’s idea is that 
if you get the fundamental ontology in place, this can then be elaborated 
on the level of political engagement. That is what he did in 1933 and that 
partly explains why I argue for a separation between politics and ontology. 
Another example that worries me is William Connolly’s attempt to place 
a vitalist metaphysics at the heart of politics. Connolly appeals to neural 
networks to explain political engagement. Much as I like Bill’s work and 
person, I find that a naturalistic delusion of a serious order. Politics is 
about politics. Gramsci understood that: politics is about forging 
coalitions and there is no support on the ontological level or logic of 
history that is going to do anything. Even though Badiou is not a reader of 
Gramsci you find this in Badiou as well: events are constructed by the 
people without an ontological support. Such is my position. Now, I am in 
the process of qualifying this a bit: the construction of such events could 
be called ontological. Badiou and I had a debate about this very issue 
which is available online.1 But I am now prepared to concede that the 
creation of political subjectivity is about the ontology of the new and you 
could give a Foucaultian twist to that if that turns you on.  
So you are in between pure spontaneous happenings, as argued for by 
Rancière, and stable ontologies. Is this why you emphasize the ethical 
moment, because it gives some stability and does not leave everything to 
chance? 
SC: I don’t use the word stable. You often hear theorists say that true 
politics is rare. That is a Heideggerian trope which we can do without. 
That is just not true sociologically speaking, there are all sorts of things 
happening. And people are doing these things not on the basis of purely 
political imperatives but usually on the basis of ideas of responsibility, 
responding to certain wrongs and injustice in mainly ethical frameworks. 
The theoretical task is complicated: on the one hand, I want to describe 
things that are actually happening but on the other hand, I give a 
normative recommendation. My belief about ethics is that it is in the 
business of giving recommendations and nothing more. Ethics is not like 
logic that is true in virtue of its form or natural science that is true in 
virtue of its verified validity. Normative considerations are true in virtue of 
being recommended and accepted as such. Nothing is doing the work 
behind our back; once again, that is my worry about Habermassian 
approaches. Furthermore, if ethics would give more than recom-
mendations it would be against a conception of freedom: you cannot 
force people to be free as Rousseau wished. Therefore I am trying to give a 
picture of ethical subjectivity drawing on Lacan, Badiou and Løgstrup. It is 
perhaps an overly philosophical image but what it comes down to for me 
is anarchism. Today, on the way in from Amsterdam’s central station, I 
saw an anarchist slogan on the wall: ‘Freedom lives when the state dies’. 
That is the classical anarchist position. I am arguing for an anarchism of 
responsibility, a Levinasian anarchism. Anarchism in the sixties was 
libertarian and organized around issues of sexual liberation. That moment 
has passed. People are and should be organizing around responsibility.  
Let us go back to Gramsci again. During the seventies many people found 
Gramsci liberating because of his emphasis on the importance of civil 
society as against the omnipresent state. Do you believe in the existence of 
a civil society? Let us specify this question with an example. There was a 
big research project done in The Netherlands on state initiatives with 
regard to the integration of minorities. The result of this project showed 
that integration was largely successful but integration policy was mainly 
unsuccessful. This suggests that there is something like a civil society, 
which has some authority over individuals and acts behind our backs. 
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SC: Yes, there is a civil society and Gramsci was very eloquent in 
describing that. The difficulty is that civil society can also yield forms of 
authoritarianism: it depends on the context. Take integration. One image 
of England is based around the notion of the integrated commercial city 
with London as a paradigm case. You can imagine describing that like 
Homi Bhabha does: putting emphasis on the emergence of hybrid cul-
tures. I sometimes believe that. But then you have 7/7, the so-called 
terrorist attacks in London by second generation working-class Muslims 
from the depressed north of England. This leads to a different picture of 
civil society, which puts more stress on exclusion. Yet, I remain essentially 
positive about civil society. There is something endlessly creative and 
fascinating to it. Not for nothing, I am currently writing a book on 
Rousseau that circles around the catechism of citizenship. 
By way of conclusion, could you elaborate on this catechism a bit? In how 
far does your new book on citizenship differ from the political ethics you 
developed in Infinitely Demanding? 
It is an attempt to develop the position in Infinitely Demanding into 
questions about the relation between three concepts: politics, law and 
religion. A version comes out in German in September with Diaphanes, 
though I am still working on the argument. Very simply, this research is 
about the relation between politics and belief. I argue that there is no 
politics worthy of the name without the experience of something like 
belief. As Oscar Wilde says, ‘Every thing to be true must become a 
religion.’ I try and show the necessity for a moment of sacralization in the 
constitution of any polity and lay out a history of such sacralization, with 
historical examples of civil religion from the ancient Greeks through to 
American democracy, state socialism, current often vacuous debates 
about European identity and the spectre of Jihadism. Using Rousseau as a 
guide, I will show in detail how politics and law require something like 
religion to bind citizens together. This is what I call ‘the catechism of the 
citizen’. Such a model of politics significantly challenges the standard left-
liberal secularization narrative. I conclude by criticizing the contemporary 
theologization of politics, arguing instead for belief at the level of poetry 
rather than religion. This leads to the closing hypothesis of what I call ‘a 
politics of the supreme fiction’, where I try and draw together my work 
on poetry, particularly Wallace Stevens, that I have been engaged in for 
years with my interest in politics. To be honest, I am not sure at this stage 
if my argument is plausible. I am going to try and work it out in my 
teaching this autumn. 
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